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CHAPTER 13 
Labor Relations 
ROBERT M. SEGAL 
A. LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND 
DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 
§13.1. General. The most important development in the dynamic 
and fluid field of labor during the 1959 SURVEY year was the passage 
of the federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 
1959.1 The new law, consisting of seven titles and 16,240 words, is 
the first major change in our federal labor law since the Taft-Hartley 
Act of 1947.2 It is basically two measures: (1) a code of conduct in the 
first six titles aimed at eliminating corrupt practices and abuses in 
union-employer relations and in the internal operations of labor 
unions, and (2) amendments (in Title VII) to the Taft-Hartley Act 
in the field of labor relations.s 
§I3.2. "Bill of Rights." The new law regulates the internal af-
fairs of labor organizations by setting up a statutory "Bill of Rights."1 , 
It provides for equal rights to nominate candidates and vote in elec-
tions, to attend meetings, to criticize the union or its officers and to 
express views freely at meetings, subject to the union's right to impose 
ROBERT M. SEGAL is a partner in the firm of Segal and Flamm, Boston. He is 
co-chairman of the Labor-Management Law Committee of the Boston Bar Assoda-
tion and a past chairman of the Labor Relations Law Section of the American Bar 
,Association. He is a consultant for the Survey of the Legal Profession and wrote its 
report on "Labor Union Lawyers." He is currently a lecturer on labor law at Har-
vard University, and is the author of various articles in the field of labor rela-
tions law. 
§I!I.I. 1 Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519, signed by the President on September 
14,1959. 
:I Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§141-197 (1952)_ 
3 For a discussion of the background to the new law, see Bureau of National Af-
fairs, The Labor Reform Law, pp. 1-5 (1959); CCH, The New Labor Law of 1959 
with Explanations, pp. 9-14 (1959). For Senator Kennedy's report to the Senate on 
the new "law, see 105 Congo Rec. 16413-16418 (Sept. 3, 1959). See also House Con-
ference Report No. 1147 (Sept. 3, 1959), including the Statement of the Managers 
,on the Part of the House; Section by Section Analysis, prepared for the Subcom-
mittee on Labor of th~ ColJllDittee OD Labor ~~ Public Welfare, U.S. Senate (Sept. 
10,1959). 
§13.2. 1 For a justification of this approach, see Findings and Declantion of Pol-
icy in the new law, §2. See also Cox. The Role of Law in Preserving Democracy, 72 
Harv. L. Rev. 609 (1959). 
* 
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134 1959 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §13.3 
reasonable rules uniformly applied for the conduct of the meetings. 
Local union dues or initiation fees cannot be increased nor can assess-
ments be levied by local union officers or executive boards except by 
a majority vote of the members voting in a secret ballot election after 
notice or by a secret ballot membership referendum. 
No member can be fined, suspended or otherwise disciplined by a 
union (except for non-payment of dues) unless certain formalities are 
met, i.e., specific written charges, reasonable time to prepare a defense, 
a full and fair hearing, and compliance with the union constitution.2 
Members are given the right, free from union discipline, to sue unions 
or officers in courts after four months' exhaustion of internal union 
remedies.s Any person whose rights are violated can bring a civil suit 
in the federal court and it is a crime for any person to use force or 
threats to restrain, coerce, intimidate or interfere with any union mem-
ber exercising any of his rights under the new law. Furthermore, a 
member retains all his present rights (relative to conduct prior to an 
election) under the union constitution, state and federal laws. 
Every labor union must inform all its members about the provisions 
of the new federal law, and must furnish a copy of the collective bar-
gaining agreement to each employee who requests it and is covered 
by the contract. National or company-wide agreements must be avail-
able for inspection in local union offices. 
§13.3. Reporting. Five different types of reporting to the United 
States Secretary of Labor are required by the new law. Every labor 
union must adopt a constitution and by-laws and file a copy with the 
Secretary. It must file a report signed by the president and union 
secretary giving the names and titles of its officers, its fees, dues struc-
ture, and detailed information on qualifications for membership, par-
ticipation in insurance or other plans, discipline, calling of meetings, 
audits, strike authorization and other procedures.1 
Every union must file a detailed annual financial report, signed by 
the president and treasurer, with the Secretary of Labor.2 It must 
2 In the light of the detailed requirements of the new law relative to discipline 
of a union member. it can be argued that Section 8(a)(~) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
49 Stat. 542 (19~5). as amended. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(~) (1952). limiting discharges from 
employment to non-payment of dues. should be repealed since the new law gives 
adequate protection against the abuse of disciplinary power. At the same time. Sec-
tion 8(a)(~) of Taft-Hartley denies a union the power to use the union shop as a 
means of disciplining wildcat strikes. espionage for a dual union or for the employer. 
or for membership in the Communist Party. See Cox. The Role of Law in Preserv-
ing Democracy. 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609. 62~-624 (1959). 
3 For a criticism of the procedures of the new law. see Senator Morse's statement 
in 105 Cong. Rec. 16~84-16401 (Sept. ~. 1959). See also Senator Kennedy's statement 
in 105 Congo Rec. 16414 (Sept. ~. 1959). 
§1~.~. 1 The Secretary of Labor has already issued Form LM-I which must be 
filed by December l~. 1959. In addition he has published eleven pamphlets as in-
formation documents relative to the new law and has set up a Bureau of Labor-
Management Reports. 
2 At the same time. the financial and other reports required by Sections 9(£). (g) 
and (h) of the Taft-Hartley Act have been repealed by the new law. 
2
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§13.4 LABOR RELATIONS 135 
show the financial condition and operations for the fiscal year, giving 
details on receipts and expenditures, loans to officers, members and 
employees in excess of $250, loans to business, per capita payments, and 
disbursements to each officer or employee if they exceed $10,000. 
Every member has a right to see the financial reports and "for just 
cause" to see the financial books and records of his union, which must 
be retained for five years for verification by the Secretary of Labor. 
1£ necessary, the member can sue for this right in the federal court, 
which can assess attorney's fees and suit costs against the union and 
its officers. 
Every individual union officer and employee has to file annual re-
ports if he is involved in certain enumerated conflict of interest trans-
actions. These include any loans, payments, reimbursements, special 
discounts and other financial transactions (except listed securities) 
which he or members of his family had with an employer whose em-
ployees his labor union represents or is seeking to represent. 
Employers must also make annual financial reports signed by the 
company officers if they have engaged in certain enumerated trans-
actions. These include payments or loans to officers, agents or em-
ployees of unions, and payments or expenditures made to "persuade, 
interfere with, restrain or coerce" employees in their rights to or-
ganize and bargain collectively, or to obtain information concerning 
union activities. In addition, the employer must report any agree-
ment with, and payments relative to labor activities to, any inde-
pendent labor relations consultant. The latter has to report to the 
Secretary of Labor within thirty days any agreement he has with an 
employer whereby he is to persuade employees or to furnish informa-
tion relative to labor and union activities; the report also contains 
specified financial data. Excepted from these provisions are persons 
giving advice to the employer, representing the employer before any 
court, administrative or arbitral tribunal, or engaging in collective 
bargaining on behalf of the employer. The law also declares that 
nothing in the act shall require an attorney to include in any report 
any information lawfully communicated to him by any of his clients 
in the course of a "legitimate" attorney-client relationship. 
The reports, which must be kept for five years, are public informa-
tion and can be published by the Secretary of Labor, who is given 
broad rule-making, investigatory and subpoena powers3 as well as 
power to bring civil suits for enforcement in the federal court. In 
addition there are criminal penalties for willful violations of 'the re-
porting requirements. 
§13.4. Trusteeships. Union trusteeships are also regulated by the 
act but are not prohibited, for their indispensability is recognized.1 
8 He is given the same powers as the Federal Trade Commission. 15 U.S.C. §§49. 
50 (1952). 
§11l.4. 1 See testimony of George Meany. President of the AFL·CIO. before the 
Senate Subcommittee. Hearings on Union Financial and Administrative Practices 
and Procedures Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on 
3
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They can be established only in accordance with the union constitu~ 
tion and on the basis of broad general standards (i.e., to correct cor-
ruption or financial malpractice, to insure the performance of labor 
agreements, to restore democratic procedures, or otherwise to cairy 
out the union's legitimate objectives). During their first eighteen 
months, they are presumed to be valid if established according to the 
procedural requirements of the union constitution and authorized 
or ratified after a fair hearing by the international union; but detailed 
reports (which are made public) must be filed with the Secretary of 
Labor. During the trusteeship, delegates cannot vote in national 
elections unless they have been chosen by a secret ballot vote of all 
members in good standing, and the funds of the trusteed local cannot 
be transferred. Any union member, or the Secretary of Labor upon 
written complaint of any member, can bring suit to enforce this sec-
tion. In addition, the member has all his present rights and remedies 
at law or in equity until the Secretary of Labor files a complaint in the 
federal court, whose jurisdiction then becomes exclusive and whose 
final judgment is res judicata. This provision should help to produce 
uniformity in this area. 
§13.5. Union elections. Union elections are regulated as to fre-
quency, procedure and qualifications.1 National and international 
unions must elect officers at least once every five years either by secret 
ballot of the membership or by a convention of delegates elected by 
secret ballot. Local unions must elect officers by secret ballot at least 
once every three years after at least fifteen days' written notice mailed 
to each member. Proxy vQting is prohibited. Nominations are not 
so governed, but reasonable opportunity must be given for nomina-
tions and every "member in good standing" is eligible to be a candidate 
subject to "reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed." 2 Union 
funds cannot be used to promote any candidate but can be used for 
notices and the expense of the election. Candidates can inspect mem-
bership lists once, have equal facilities for the distribution of their 
literature at their own expense, and have observers present at the 
casting and counting of the ballots, which must be preserved for one 
year. In addition, the provisions of the union constitution not incon-
sistent with the new law must be complied with in elections. 
Once an election is held, the aggrieved member can complain to the 
Secretary of Labor only after three months of exhaustion of the internal 
union remedies; the Secretary investigates election complaints and if 
Labor and Public Welfare, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-70 (1958). See also Cox, The 
Role of Law in Preserving Democracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609. 635-644 (1959). 
§13.5. 1 In explaining these provisions. the Senate Committee report makes it 
definite that states are precluded from imposing requirements upon unions for con-
ducting elections of officers with greater frequency than provided for in the federal 
law. The report stressed the need for uniformity in laws governing union elections. 
pointing out that many unions function in several states. See CCH. The New 
Labor Law of 1959 with Explanations 36-37 (1959). 
2 The meaning of the quoted words of the statute may well not be determined 
until after many years of litigation. 
4
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he finds probable cause to believe that a violation has occurred and 
is unremedied for sixty days, he must bring a civil action in the federal 
court. The court will set aside elections and order a new election 
under the Secretary's supervision and regulations if it finds, upon a 
preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the election was not held 
within the prescribed time limits, or (2) the violation may have af-
fected the results of the election. At the same time the challenged 
election is presumed valid pending a final decision except that a court-
directed election will not be stayed, pending appeal; the court also has 
power to take action by appointment of a temporary receiver to pre-
serve the union's assets. In addition, if the union's constitution does 
not provide adequate procedures (as determined by rules and regula~ 
tions promulgated by the Secretary) for the removal of officers "guilty 
of serious misconduct," a member, after three months of exhaustion 
of internal procedure, may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, 
who holds a hearing and can have the guilty officer removed by a secret 
ballot election of the membership. In addition, the Secretary can 
bring a federal court action as provided in election cases. 
§I3.6. "Restrictions" on labor organizations. Union officials and 
agents are placed under a fiduciary duty to the members by the act, 
which restates the common law applicable to trust relations. Not 
only are all conflict of interest transactions prohibited but exculpatory 
clauses in union constitutions are voided. Aggregate loans in excess 
of $2000 to union officers are prohibited, and unions (and employers) 
cannot pay the fines of any officer or employee convicted of any willful 
violation of the new law. Union officials must hold the union money 
and property "solely" for the benefit of the organization and its mem. 
bers. Not only are they bound to follow the constitution and by-laws 
of the labor union relative to the union funds and property but they 
are liable for acts of omission as well as acts of commission, since they 
are regarded as trustees, considering "the special problems and func-
tions of a labor organization." Union officers can be personally sued 
for personal profits resulting from their position, and if the union 
refuses to sue, an individual member can, on ex parte application, 
bring an action after court approval, in any federal or state court for 
the benefit of the union. The court may allot a reasonable part of any 
recovery to pay the counsel fees and the plaintiff's expenses . 
. At the same time, there are statutory restrictions on eligible candi-
dates for union office. Persons convicted of felonies and violations of 
certain sections of the new law or persons who have been members of 
the Communist Party are prohibited from holding union office or staff 
employment or being a labor relations consultant for a period of five 
years following the termination of party membership, criminal con-
viction or the end of the imprisonment. Furthermore, every union 
officer and employee handling funds must be personally bonded by a 
surety company, authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury as an 
. acceptable surety on federal bonds, "for the faithful discharge of his 
eluties" in an amount not less than 10 percent of the funds handled 
5
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by him. In addition, every representative of a union or health and 
welfare trust must be similarly bonded, and the law can be read to 
require employer trustees to be bonded on the same terms.1 Although 
embezzlement of union funds is already a state crime, the new law 
also makes it a federal crime. 
§13.7. Taft-Hartleyamendments.1 The most controversial amend-
ments in the new law are in the field of labor relations. Departing 
in part from the principle of a national labor relations policy, the 
new law delegates to the state labor agencies (such as the Massachusetts 
Labor Relations Commission) and state courts the cases in the so-called 
"no man's land," 2 i.e., cases in interstate commerce but below the 
jurisdictional standards set by the NLRB in August, 1959.3 The new 
law does not require initial resort to the NLRB, but the state agency 
or court will decide (subject to review by the United States Supreme 
Court) whether the labor dispute is one in which the NLRB declines 
by rule of decision or published rules to assert jurisdiction.4 At the 
same time, the extent to which states may assert jurisdiction over cases 
that affect interstate commerce and also meet the NLRB's jurisdic-
tional standards is still governed by the principles of federal pre-emp-
tion most recently summarized by the United States Supreme Court 
in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.5 
Replaced economic strikers will be able to vote in NLRB elections 
held within twelve months after the start of the strike, subject to such 
rules as the NLRB may issue.6 Furthermore the NLRB must now 
§15.6. 1 Section 502(a) of the new law provides in part as follows: "Every officer, 
agent, shop steward, or other representative or employee of any labor organization 
... or of a trust in which a labor organization is interested, who handles funds or 
other property thereof shall be bonded for the faithful discharge of his duties." For 
a criticism of the bonding requirements, see Morse in 105 Congo Rec. 16588-16589 
(Sept. 5, 1959). 
§15.7. 1 These amendments are contained in Title VII of the new law. 
2 NLRB, Twenty-Third Annual Report, p. 8 (1958); for the "no man's land" cases, 
see San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 559 U.S. 256, 79 Sup. Ct. 775, 
5 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1959); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. I, 77 Sup. Ct. 
598, I L. Ed. 2d 601 (1957). The Court has, however, held that the NLRB may not 
refuse to exercise jurisdiction over an entire industry as a class. Hotel Employees 
Local V. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99, 79 Sup. Ct. 150, 3 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1959); Office Employ-
ees V. Labor Board, 353 U.S. 313, 77 Sup. Ct. 799. I L. Ed. 2d 846 (1957). 
In addition, the new law retains Section 14(b) of Taft-Hartley, permitting states 
to pass more restrictive legislation in the union security field. 
S NLRB Press Release R·576, Oct. 2, 1958. 
4 The NLRB has established declaratory judgment procedures for parties and 
agencies in state labor cases to obtain board opinions on federal jurisdiction. NLRB 
Press Release R·639, Nov. 8, 1959. 
5359 U.S. 236, 79 Sup. Ct. 773, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1959), commented on in §13.9 
infra. See also 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.1; 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §25.1. 
6 Under the Wagner Act, the NLRB originally voted the strikers and excluded 
the replacements. A. Sartorius &: Co., Inc., 10 N.L.R.B. 493 (1938). In 1941, the 
NLRB reversed itself and held that both strikers and replacements should be al-
lowed to vote in an NLRB representation election. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 32 
N.L.R.B. 163 (1941). This rule was followed until the Taft.Hartley amendments. 
Lloyd Hollister, Inc., 68 N.L.R.B. 733 (1946). The Taft-Hartley Act. §9(c)(3), pro-
6
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give priority to complaints involving discharges for discrimination by 
an employer or a union. The NLRB can delegate to its twenty-three 
regional directors authority to handle election cases, with final deci-
sions subject to appeal to the NLRB, which may hear and decide all 
cases by a panel of three members. 
Picketing for recognition or organization is outlawed and subject 
to injunctions by the General Counsel of the NLRB in three specific 
cases: (I) the employer has lawfully recognized another union;7 (2) a 
valid election has been held within the preceding twelve months; or 
(3) the picketing has continued for a reasonable time (not exceeding 
thirty days) without a petition for an election being filed. 8 If a peti-
tion is filed, the NLRB has to move "forthwith" to hold an election;1I 
informational picketing (not for recognition or organization), with 
clear signs notifying consumers that the employer is non-union, is per-
mitted unless the picketing has the effect of interrupting deliveries 
by teamsters or of causing other employees to respect the picket line. to 
vided, "Employees on strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall not be 
eligible to vote." The new law does not make it clear whether the present rules 
relative to "misconduct" will be applied to economic strikers. Republic Steel Corp. 
v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1939). 
7 The provision does not apply if the employer's recognition of the other union 
was unlawful, or even if it was lawful if a question concerning representation may 
appropriately be raised. This brings into play the board's various rules and doc-
trines as to when a union may obtain an election even though another union has 
theretofore been certified and recognized. 
Senator Kennedy's explanation, 105 Congo Rec. 16415 (Sept. 3, 1959), is as follows: 
"Two of the three restrictions upon organizational picketing are taken from the 
Senate bill. Paragraphs (A) and (B) of the new section 8(b)(7), which is added to 
the National Labor Relations Act, prohibit picketing for union organization or 
recognition at times when the National Labor Relations Board would not conduct 
an election. Subdivision (A) covers the situation where a contract with another 
union is a bar to an election. If the contract is not a bar, either because the incum-
bent union was recognized improperly or lacked majority support, or because the 
contract had run for a reasonable period, a question concerning representation could 
appropriately be raised and subdivision (A) would not bar the picketing. Subdi-
vision (B) bars union recognition for 12 months after an election in order to secure 
the expressed desire of the employees. In both cases the prohibitions relate only to 
picketing in an effort to organize employees or secure recognition in a bargaining 
unit covered by the existing contract or the prior election." 
8 Under this section, picketing could theoretically be barred in less than thirty 
days provided the NLRB could as a practical matter hold an election. Furthermore 
the filing of a petition by any person (employer or union) will legalize this picketing 
beyond the thirty day limit. In picketing cases, the NLRB must determine whether 
the picketing falls within Section 8(b)(7)(C) so as to direct an election "forthwith." 
\I The problem of "forthwith" directing an election is a serious one, for the NLRB 
must determine "the appropriate unit," which requires the making of a record, and 
pre-hearing elections are not authorized. 
to The informational picketing and advertising permitted is limited in scope: 
truthfully a~vising that the employer does not employ members of or have a contract 
with a union. It would seem that constitutional issues are raised by this limitation 
as well as the limitation that peaceful truthful informational picketing is illegal if 
its effect is to induce any person to refuse to perform services in the course of his 
employment. 
Senator Kennedy's explanation of this section is as follows: "Organizational picket-
7
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If a union can show that the employer has committed an unfair labor 
practice by signing with another union, then the union can picket 
without being enjoined. Picketing for the personal profit of any per-
son ("extortion picketing") is subject to severe criminal penalties. 
Secondary boycotts (i.e., putting a picket line around employer B 
to make him cease doing business with employer A, who is struck by 
the union) are outlawed. It is now illegal to bring pressure not only 
upon the employees of the second employer but also directly upon the 
neutral second employer B. Furthermore in a strike against employer 
A it is even illegal to induce the individual employees of employer B 
(including employees of railroads or government agencies) to refuse 
to deal with the goods or materials of the struck employer A.ll The 
picketing of a retail store selling goods produced by a struck manufac-
turer or jobber is forbidden although the use of handbills or other 
forms of. publicity is legal, provided these do not affect the working 
employees or teamsters delivering goods to the store.12 At the same 
time a primary strike against an employer is legal, and it is not unlaw-
ful for employees of a second employer to refuse to cross the picket 
lines at the struck plant.1s The new law does not overrule the "ally" 
doctrines whereby a union can picket a secondary employer who is 
directly allied with, or makes an "arrangement" with, the struck em-
ployer to do the farmed-out struck work,14 nor does it prohibit pub-
licity (leaflets, ads, etc.) to influence customers (as distinguished from 
employees).15 At the same time, if an employer has a permanent place 
of business where a union may picket, then picketing at another situs 
where other employers are working is not permitted by the new law.1s 
ing:" The House bill would have forbidden virtually all organizational picketing. 
even though the pickets did not stop truck deliveries or exercise other economic 
coercion. The amendments adopted in the conference secure the right to engage in 
all forms of organizational picketing up to the time of an election in which the 
employees can freely express their desires with respect to the choice of a bargaining 
representative. When the picketing results in economic pressure through the refusal 
of other employees to cross the picket line. the bill would require a prompt election. 
Purely informational picketing cannot be curtailed under the conference report. al-
though even this privilege would have been denied by the Landrum·Griffin meas-
Ure." 105 Congo Rec. 1641!! (Sept. !I. 1959). 
See also the speech by Senator Morse in 105 Congo Rec. 16!199·16400 (Sept. !I. 1959). 
NLRB member Fanning recently stated that the new restrictions on organizational 
and recognition picketing i~ many ways are not as broad as those previously imposed 
.by the NLRB in the Curtis and related cases. 119 N.L.R.B. 2!!2 (1957). 
1l:The new law overrules in part NLRB V. International Rice Milling Co .• !!41 
U.S. 665.71 Sup. Ct. 961, 95 L. Ed. 1277 (1951). and closes several alleged "loopholes" 
in this area. 
" "12 See note 10 supra. 
13 See provisos in Section 704(a) of the new act. 
14 NLRB V. Business Machine and Office Appliance Mechanics Board, 228 F.2d 
55!! (2d Cir. 1955); Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 
(S.D.N.Y. 1948). Also see Die Sinkers Union, 120 N.L.R.B. 1227 (1958). " 
111 See note 10 supra. 
16 See NLRB V. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council. !l41 U.S. 675. 
71 Sup. Ct. 94!!. 95 L. Ed. 1284 (1951); Brotherhood of Painters. Decorators and 
Paper. Hangers and Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 110 N.I:..R.B. 455 (1954); Washing. 
8
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Employer contributions to unions for pooled vacation, ho~i~ay, 
severance and other benefits, and apprenticeship and other trammg 
programs, are now specifically permitted under joint trust fund ar-
rangements similar to the health and welfare plans permitted under 
the Taft-Hartley Act.17 At the same time, the demand for, or the 
payments of, fees or charges for unloading a truck are prohibited ex-
cept for wage payments directly to the employees of the employer. 
"Hot cargo" or "struck goods" or "unfair employer" clauses are pro-
hibited and made subject to priority injunction except in the con-
struction and garment industries. The strike for,18 or the making 
of, such a clause is made an unfair labor practice subject to priority 
injunctions and private damage suits. Excepted from this provision 
and from the secondary boycott section are subcontracting clauses in 
the garment and clothing industry relative to working on the goods 
or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or performing parts of an 
integrated process of production. 
In the construction industry, subcontract clauses for on-the-site 
work, pre-hire contracts,19 'seven-day union shop clauses, and objective 
hiring hall 20 provisions are also permitted. 
ton Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 233 (1953); Moore Drydock Co., 81 
N.L.R.B. 1108 (1949). 
17 Recently a federal district judge ruled that apprenticeship training funds were 
exempted from Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act. The court stated that the 
amendment in the new law was intended to correct court rulings that had applied 
the language of Section 302 too literally. Electrical Contractors v. Local 130, IBEW, 
177 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. La. 1959). 
18 In the Sand Door case, Local No. 1796, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. 
NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 78 Sup. Ct. lOll, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1186 (1958), the Supreme Court 
held that the existence of a hot cargo provision was not a defense to a charge of in-
ducing employees to strike or refuse to handle goods for objectives proscribed by 
Section 8(b)(4)(A). The Court, however, declined to pass upon the validity of the 
hot cargo clauses and left open the question whether they could be enforced by 
means other than strikes or boycotts, prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(A). 
19 The House managers claim that a strike for a pre-hire contract is illegal, 105 
Cong. Rec. 16553 (Sept. 3, 1959), but Rep. Thompson had the following to say on 
the House floor relative to this matter: "Mr. Speaker, in connection with the con-
ference report there is one more matter of great importance which must be made 
clear if there is to be a valid legislative history accompanying this vital legislation. 
I did not have an opportunity to see or to read the statement of the Managers oil 
the part of the House before it appeared in the Congressional Record today. Upon 
a very hasty examination of this document, I find at least one statement the~ein 
upon which I should like to make this comment for purposes of clarification. The 
last paragraph of the statement is correct when it refers to the fact that the' con-
ference adopted the provision of the Senate bill permitting pre-hire agreements in 
the building and construction industry. In these circumstances, the considerations 
in the Senate committee report which were before the Senate when it debated the 
bill are governing in determining the intent of the language on this subject in the 
conference report. 
"With respect to the phrase in the last pat:agraph of the statement that nothing 
in section 705 is intended 'to authorize the use of force, coercion, strikes, or picket-
ing to compel any person to enter into such pre-hire agreements,' I would state 
that literally speaking, the above quoted phrase is not incorrect. However, it should 
be entirely clear that there is no language in the conference report which justified 
9
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§13.8. Conclusions. The new law raises many constitutional is-
sues1 (free speech relative to the picketing and publicity prohibitions,2 
privilege against self-incrimination relative to mandatory reporting of 
prohibited transactions subject to criminal penalties, and unreasonable 
search and seizure relative to the broad investigatory and subpoena 
powers of the Secretary of Labor) and many other legal problems (in-
terpretation of general phrases, duplication of remedies, interrelation 
of secondary boycott and picketing sections, and the interpretation 
of the broad "hot cargo" clause). At the same time it weakens our 
national labor policy but increases the workload of the state labor 
boards and state courts which receive jurisdiction over the "no man's 
land" cases. It will produce protracted litigation and, in the words 
of the Christian Science Monitor, "will need 'good lawyering' to inter-
pret what its legal language means, and what final effect it will have 
on unions." 
B. FEDERAL DECISIONS 
§13.9. Pre-emption. Two leading cases decided by the United 
States Supreme Court in the October Term, 1958, are important vari-
ants of the much litigated problem of federal-state relations.1 In the 
first case, San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,2 the Court 
was dealing with the same parties for a second time. The original 
litigation arose as a result of peaceful picketing, allegedly to compel 
any implication that section 705 is intended to deny the right of a union to strike or 
to picket for a legal object, such as a pre-hire agreement in the building and con-
struction industry which is validated by Section 705." 105 Cong. Rec. 16636 (Sept. 
4,1959). 
It would seem that a strike or picketing to secure these pre-hire provisions which 
are specifically lawful (§8(e) of Taft-Hartley) is no different than a strike or picket 
line to secure any other lawful contractual provision. 
20 See Associated General Contractors (Mountain Pacific case), 119 N .L.R.B. 883, 
reversed and remanded sub nom. NLRB v. Associated General Contractors, 270 
F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959). 
§13.8. 1 For a detailed criticism of the new law and the legal problems created 
by the new law, see speech by Senator Morse in the Senate in 105 Congo Rec. 16371-
16401 (Sept. 3, 1959). See generally Segal, The New Federal Labor Statute, 46 
A.B.A.J.31 (1960); Symposium, 48 Geo. L.J. 205-429 (1959). 
2 The question of violations of Section 8(b)(I) by peaceful picketing and publicity 
has recently been raised in several cases. Drivers Local 639 V. NLRB, 36 CCH Lab. 
Cases ~65,O!l0 (D.C. Cir. 1958), rev'g Curtis Bros., Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957); 
NLRB V. lAM., Lodge 942, 263 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'g Machinists Union, 119 
N.L.R.B. 307 (1957). These issues are currently pending before the Supreme Court. 
See Drivers Local 639 V. NLRB, 359 U.S. 965, 79 Sup. Ct. 876, 3 L. Ed. 2d 833 (1959). 
The Supreme Court has several times in the past held that peaceful truthful picket-
ing is protected under the free speech amendment to the Constitution. Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940); AFL V. Swing, 312 U.S. 
321, 61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855 (1940); cf. International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
v. Vogt, 354 U.s. 284,77 Sup. Ct. 1166, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1!l47 (1957). 
§13.9. 1 See 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.1; 1957 Ann. Surv. Mals. Law §25.1. 
2359 U.S. 236,79 Sup. Ct. 773,!l L. Ed. 2d 775 (1959). 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1959 [1959], Art. 17
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1959/iss1/17
§13.9 LABOR RELATIONS 143 
the employer to sign a union security contract. A representation peti-
tion filed by the employer was dismissed by the Regional Director on 
jurisdictional grounds. In the state court, the employer obtained an 
injunction against the picketing and an award of $1000 damages for 
losses sustained because of the picketing. On certiorari in the first 
cases the Supreme Court had reversed the injunction on the basis of 
the Garner' line of cases, but remanded the case for a clearer ruling 
on the local law question of the basis for the damage award. On re-
mand, the California court by a 4-3 decision sustained the damage 
award, holding that the picketing constituted a tort based upon an 
unfair labor practice under state law.1I 
In the present case, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the 
holding of the California court, and clarified one of the unsettled areas 
of the federal pre-emption field. The Court in effect ruled that states 
may not award damages (or injunctions) to an employer for losses 
suffered as a result of conduct which is protected, or which the NLRB 
might reasonably consider protected, by Section 7 of the NLRA. The 
opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Harlan, with whom Justices Clark, 
Whittaker and Stewart joined, put their concurrence in the result 
"upon the narrow ground that the Union's activities for which the 
State has awarded damages may fairly be considered protected under 
the Taft-Hartley Act, and that therefore state action is precluded until 
the National Labor Relations Board has made a contrary determina-
tion respecting such activities." 6 
In the Garmon case, the Court by a 5-4 vote settled a second area of 
federal pre-emption: the interdiction of state action against action 
prohibited by the federal labor law. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered 
the opinion of the Court which held that the prohibition against state 
action pending an NLRB decision upon whether the defendant's action 
is prohibited by the NLRA extends to actions for damages as well as 
suits for injunctions;7 the opinion confines the Laburnum and Russell 
cases8 to situations involving violence or other imminent threats to do-
mestic peace or "merely peripheral concern" to the federal statutory 
3858 U.S. 26, 77 Sup. Ct. 607, 1 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1957). 
4 Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs &: Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 74 
Sup. Ct. 161, 98 L. Ed. 228 (1953), discussed in 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.1. 
1\ Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 44 Cal. 2d 595, 820 P.2d 473 
(1958). 
8859 U.S. 286, 249, 79 Sup. Ct. 778, 782, 8 L. Ed. 2d 775, 785·786 (1959). 
7 In 1959, on the authority of the Garner, Weber and Fairlawn cases, the Supreme 
Court in a per curiam opinion reversed an injunction granted by the Florida courts 
which had enjoined organizational picketing of resort hotels engaged in interstate 
commerce. The Court stated that the Florida courts did not have jurisdiction in this 
case whether the picketing was protected by Section 7 of the Labor·Management 
Relations Law of 1947 or prohibited by Section 8(b)(4) of the act even though the 
NLRB had refused jurisdiction of the cases. Hotel Employees Union v. Sax En· 
terprises, 358 U.S. 270, 79 Sup. Ct. 278, 8 L. Ed. 2d 289 (1959). 
8 Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 856 U.S. 617, 78 Sup. Ct. 928. 2 L. Ed. 2d 
1018 (1958); United Automobile Workers v. Russell. 356 U.S. 684. 78 Sup. Ct. 982. 
2 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (1958). See 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.1. 
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scheme on the other hand. Mr. Justice Harlan and his three tolleagues 
in their special concurrence asserted that the state may also award 
damages for conduct that is or may be prohibited by federallaw.9 
Still left open is the question whether a state may act to regulate 
conduct (e.g., slowdown or a partial strike) which is neither protected 
nor prohibited by the NLRA. The opinion of the Court explicitly 
reserves judgment on this question, although the minority would hold 
that a state may regulate conduct in this intermediate area.10 Also 
still open is the related question regarding the extent to which the 
theory of "peripheral" labor matters, exemplified by Gonzales,u will 
support state jurisdiction. 
In the second important case, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. Oliver,12 the Court dealt with the question of state power to 
regulate substantive terms and conditions of employment. The Ohio 
court had, under the state antitrust laws, enjoined the performance of 
an employer's collective bargaining agreement which had special pro-
visions (wages, hours and working conditions and specified minimums 
for the use of equipment) for owner-operators. The United States 
Supreme Court reversed the injunction, holding that the federal law 
leaves "no room ... for the application of this state policy limiting 
the solution that the parties' agreement can provide to the problems 
of wages and working conditions." The Court ruled that the collective 
agreement's rental provisions were sufficiently related to the wages of 
the owner-operators to draw them within the ambit of subjects on 
which collective bargaining is required by the federal labor law. In 
broad sweeping language, the Court stated that the federal government 
has legislated so comprehensively concerning "concerted activities and 
collective bargaining" agreements that there is no room for local law 
except for "a local health or safety regulation." The Court stated: 
Federal law here created the duty upon the parties to bargain 
collectively; Congress has provided for a system of federal law 
applicable to the agreement the parties made in response to that 
duty ... and federal law sets some outside limits (not contended 
to be exceeded here) on what their agreement may provide .... 
9 The division within the Court on this vital pre-emption theory was underscored 
by the per curiam reversal, four justices dissenting, in DeVries v. Baumgartner's 
Electrical Construction Co., 1159 U.S. 498, 79 Sup. Ct. 1117, 11 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1959). 
reversing 91 N.W.2d 6611 (S.D. 1959). In this case the state court had awarded dam-
ages to an employer for picketing which . was apparently violative both of the 
·state·s right-to-work law and of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
10 The minority relied upon United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board. 11116 U.S. 245. 69 Sup. Ct. 516. 911 L. Ed. 651 (1949). Professor 
Cox argues that the Taft-Hartley Act should be held to effect a total pre-emption of 
Btate law dealing specifically with unionization and collective bargaining. Cox. The 
Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term. 1957. Proceedings of 
the ABA Section of Labor Relations Law. pp. 12. 19 (1958). 
11 Association of Machinists v. Gonzales. 1156 U.S. 617. 78 Sup. Ct. 9211.2 L. Ed. 2d 
1018 (1958). 
12358 U.s. 2811. 79 Sup. Ct. 297. 11 L. Ed. 2d 1112 (1959). 
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We believe that there is no room in this scheme for the applica-
tion here of this state policy limiting the solutions that the parties' 
agreement can provide to the problems of wages and working con-
ditions.13 
Whether the Court will limit this sweeping generalization by later 
decisions is open to question. Professor Cox believes that it will, for 
otherwise private labor contracts not even subject to approval by fed-
eral authority could override state legislation, and thus state fair em-
ployment practices, maximum hours, equal pay and similar laws regu-
lating substantive terms not inconsistent with federal legislation would 
fall.14 He maintains that 
no serious interference with the policy of encouraging union or-
ganization and collective bargaining as a method of establishing 
terms and conditions of employment is likely to result from the 
application of state legislation outlawing substantive conditions 
of employment which the state regards as undesirable without re-
gard to the method by which they are established. Where the ob-
jective is unlawful without regard to the method used to achieve 
it, Section 7 should have no application. When the objective can 
be lawfully achieved by other methods, Section 7 guarantees em-
ployees the right to resort to concert of action.15 
§13.10. Judicial review. Another important labor decision of the 
United States Supreme Court, Leedom v. Kyne} dealt with judicial 
review of orders in proceedings to resolve a question of employee 
representation. The Westinghouse Engineers Association had filed 
a petition under Section 9 of the NLRA seeking certification as the 
bargaining representative of 233 professional employees. The NLRB 
found that nine non-professional employees had a community of in-
terest with the professionals and included them in the unit. The elec-
tion was held over the objection of the association, which was certified 
as the bargaining representative but which brought an action under 
Section 24 of the Judicial Code alleging that the NLRB's action de-
prived it of the statutory right to have the unit cohfined to profes-
sionals. The Court held that the suit "is not one 'to review' in the 
sense of that term as used in the Act, a decision of the Board made 
within its jurisdiction. Rather it is one to strike down an order of the 
Board made in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific 
prohibition in the Act." For the board to include non-professional 
employees in the unit without polling the professional employees "de-
prived the professional employees of a right 'assured to them by Con-
gress. . .. Where, as here, Congress has given a right' to the pro-
1S 358 U.S. at 296, 79 Sup. Ct. at 304·305, 3 L. Ed. 2d at 321 (1959). 
14 Cox. The Major Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court, October Term 1958, 
Proceedings of the A.B.A. Section of Labor Relations; pp. 23, 25-31 (1959). 
15 Ibid. 
§13.l0. 1358 U.S. 184.79 Sup. Ct. 180,3 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1958). 
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fessional employees it must be held that it intended that right to be 
enforced, and 'the courts ... encounter no difficulty in fulfilling its 
purpose: " 2 
The issue of judicial review of representation orders was first raised 
in AFL v. NLRB,3 where the Court dismissed a petition, under Sec-
tion 1O(f) of the NLRA, by a union whose claim concerning the appro-
priate bargaining unit had been rejected by the NLRB; the Court held 
that the certification or determination of the bargaining unit is not an 
"order" under Section 10. Three years later, in Switchmen's Union 
of North America v. National Mediation Board,4 the Court held by a 
4-3 vote that a United States District Court had no jurisdiction under 
Section 24 of the Judicial Code to review a certification decision of 
the National Mediation Board. The Kyne case tries to distinguish the 
Switchmen's case and make it clear that the Court believes that the 
NLRB had disregarded its obvious instructions from Congress and 
that this type of case falls within the Court's scope of review. It may 
be that the Kyne case places all NLRB certifications (not orders for 
elections) in the category of reviewable orders even though Mr. Justice 
Whittak.er's majority opinion obviously attempts to confine the hold-
ing to suits which challenge a certification upon the ground that the 
NLRB acted "in excess of its delegated powers," thereby distinguish-
ing any "decision of the Board made within its jurisdiction." 
In Hotel Employees Union v. Leedom/' the Court held that the 
NLRB's jurisdictional standards could not be used to decline juris-
diction over an entire industry. Furthermore, on October 2, 1958, 
the NLRB put into effect revised jurisdictional standards which were 
expected to result in the extension of its jurisdiction to twenty percent 
of the cases formerly consigned to the "no man's land" under the Cuss 
line of cases.6 
§13.11. Massachusetts Lord's Day Statute. The so-called Sunday 
laws l of Massachusetts were involved in a federal court case. A panel 
of three judges by a 2-1 vote held that the application of these Sunday 
laws to a kosher meat market which closed on Saturday but opened 
on Sunday was a denial of the equal protection of laws and unconsti-
tutiona1.2 The case is being appealed to the United States Supreme 
2 Citing Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548,568,50 Sup. 
Ct. 427,433,74 L. Ed. 1034, 1045 (1930). 
3308 U.S. 401, 60 Sup. Ct. 300, 84 L. Ed. 347 (1940). 
4320 U.S. 297, 64 Sup. Ct. 95, 88 L. Ed. 61 (1943). 
11358 U.S. 99, 79 Sup. Ct. 150,3 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1958). 
6 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 77 Sup. Ct. 607, 
I L. Ed. 2d 618 (1957); Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Fair-
lawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20, 77 Sup. Ct. 604, I L. Ed. 2d 613 (1957); Guss v. Utah 
Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. I, 77 Sup. Ct. 598, 1 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1957); Weber v. 
Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468, 75 Sup. Ct. 480, 99 L. Ed. 546 (1955). See 42 L.R.R.M. 
96 (Revised NLRB Standards for Asserting Jurisdiction). 
§13.11. 1 G.L., c. 136. 
2 Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Gallagher, 176 F. Supp. 
466 (D. Mass. 1959). 
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Court by the Attorney General of the Commonwealth. Two essential 
issues seem to be involved in this case: (1) whether the Massachusetts 
Sunday law is a "Lord's Day" law as distinguished from a "day of rest" 
law and, if the former, does it violate the establishment clause of the 
First Amendment? and (2) does the law, by discriminating against 
Saturday observers, violate their due process rights? 3 
C. MASSACHUSEITS DECISIONS 
§13.12. Arbitration. In Kesslen Brothers, Inc. v. Board of Concili-
ation and Arbitration,l the Supreme Judicial Court held that if arbi-
trators make errors of law and not merely of fact by making findings 
not warranted by the evidence, this will not invalidate the decision 
of the arbitration board. Basically, the Court reiterated its position 
in earlier cases whereby, in the absence of fraud, the decision of arbi-
trators who are acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal is final and binding 
even though there may be an error of law or of fact. In the future, 
the new arbitration act will govern this type of case and should pro-
duce the same result.2 
§13.13. Internal union affairs. In McDermott v. jamula,1 the Su-
preme Judicial Court held that the provisions of the international con-
stitution of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 
rather than the custom or practice of the local union, govern the rela-
tionship of a member with his union. In this case, the individual 
member, a licensed electrician, sued the officers of Local 284 and the 
IBEW for alleged unjust suspension from the union. The member 
had failed to pay his $9.10 monthly membership dues for March, April 
and May until June 2, and the local secretary had returned the money 
because he was suspended for a three months' arrearage in his dues, re-
quiring application for reinstatement. The Court upheld the suspen-
sion and held that a person who fails to pay his dues in advance as 
required by the constitution can be suspended as a delinquent mem-
ber if the constitution so provides. Furthermore, the Court stated that 
a local union has no power to waive the express provisions of the 
constitution of the international union. This case has some language 
important for unions relative to dues, delinquencies, constitutions, 
and relations between locals and internationals. 
§13.14. Labor agreement. In Karcz v. Luther Manufacturing CO.,1 
the Supreme Judicial Court denied the claims of two former employees 
3 In People v. Friedman, S02 N.Y. 75, 96 N.E.2d 184 (1950), the New York Court 
of Appeals upheld a Sunday law of that state upon the ground that the statute sim-
ply provided in reasonable terms for a day of rest. The United States Supreme 
Court, without opinion, dismissed an appeal for lack of a substantial federal ques-
tion. Friedman v. New York, 341 U.S. 907, 71 Sup. Ct. 607, 95 L. Ed. IS45 (1951). 
§IU2. 11959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 90S, 158 N.E.2d 871. 
2 For comment on the new act, see §IS.17 infra. 
§IUS. 1 SS8 Mass. 2S6, 154 N.E.2d 595 (1958). 
§IS.14. 1 SS8 Mass. SIS, 155 N.E.2d 441 (1959). 
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of a textile company for retirement separation pay under a union con-
tract, when the mill closed for economic reason before the employees 
reached sixty-five, the age of retirement. The Court distinguished the 
retirement separation pay in the contract from severance pay clauses 
in many union contracts where payments are required upon the clos-
ing of a plant. The Court stressed the specific eligibility provision· of 
the union contract and found that the employees were not entitled to 
retirement separation pay based upon length of service. 
§13.15. Miscellaneous. In an important advisory opinion to the 
House of Representatives,l the Supreme Judicial Court stated that the 
General Court can constitutionally enact legislation setting up a panel 
of three judges for actions arising out of labor disputes. The Court 
also stated that the enactment of such legislation would not be class 
legislation or conflict with the requirement of equal protection under 
the law. This advisory opinion helped clear the way for the passage 
of a labor-sponsored bill providing for three judges of the Superior 
Court to hear equity actions involving labor disputes.2 
In Allied Theatres of New England, Inc. v. Commissioner of Labor 
and Industries,S the Court interpreted the procedure required for the 
judicial review of state minimum wage orders and held that the State 
Administrative Procedure Act did not overrule the judicial review 
procedure set forth in the state minimum wage law. 
D. MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATION 
§13.16.· Legislation in 1958. Several measures were passed in the 
1958 legislature after the end of the 1958 SURVEY year. These included 
an increased state minimum wagel effective January 2, 1959, estab-
lishing a $1 per hour minimum for all manufacturing employees and 
others not covered by wage boards, a floor of 90 cents per hour for all 
future wage board orders, and a floor of 65 cents for gratuity em-
ployees. Also adopted was a measure2 liberalizing the eligibility pro-
visions of the Employment Security Law by changing the language in 
the disqualification for leaving work from leaving "without good cause 
attributable to the employing unit" to "without good cause," and 
granting unemployment benefits to retired employees regardless of 
whether prior assent to compulsory retirement had been given by the 
employee either directly or indirectly through his union. This legis-
lation reverses the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in Lamont 
v. Director of the Division of Employment Security.s Also passed was 
a measure providing for the determination of prevailing wages for 
§13.15. 1 Opinion of the Justices, 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 775, 158 N.E.2d 354. 
2 Acts of 1959, c. 600, commented on in §13.18 infra. 
B 338 Mass. 609,156 N.E.2d 424 (1959). 
§13.l6. 1 Acts of 1958, cc. 61, 620. 
2 Id., c. 677.' 
3337 Mass. 328, 149 N.E.2d 372 (1958). See 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.3. 
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demolition on public work projects.4 The legislature also enacted 
and put in the general labor section a measure giving an injured em-
ployee preference for re-employment if he is capable of performing 
the available work. II The industrial homework law was further 
amended by a law providing that during a strike the employer's indus-
trial homework permits and certificates are automatically canceled 
until the strike is ended or ruled illega1.6 
Of major importance was an extensive revision7 of the Health, 
Welfare and Retirement Funds Law of 1957 which met many of the 
criticisms of the old law.8 The new law covers all health, welfare or 
retirement "trusts," 9 whether they are run solely by the union or by 
employers, or jointly by both, if the contributions come from the em-
ployer, the employees, or both, and the benefits include medical or 
hospital care, pensions, retirement pay, supplementary unemployment 
compensation, sickness compensation, or life disability or accident in-
surance for twenty-five or more beneficiaries in Massachusetts. It re-
quires registration and annual filings by all funds. In addition to the 
registration and reporting requirements, the law is regulatory, for it 
prohibits "kickbacks" and other practices. It provides criminal penal-
ties for non-payment of required health and welfare or retirement con-
tributions. It also includes a waiver provision upon application by 
funds filing under the federal disclosure law. The health, welfare and 
retirement trust funds board set up to administer the new law consists 
of the Commissioners of Banks, Insurance, and Labor and Industries, 
with a director and stafI.10 
The new Health, Welfare and Retirement Funds Board, created by 
Chapter 655 of the Acts of 1958, issued six regulations during the 
1959 SURVEY year. The first extended the time for registering funds to 
August 1, 1959. The second defined the scope of the act to cover all 
health, welfare and retirement programs or funds (unilateral or joint), 
regardless of separation or segregation, so long as they are used directly 
or through insurance for hospital, surgical, medical care, sickness or 
accident, pension, annuity, retirement, death or unemployment bene-
fits for twenty-five or more employees.n The third regulation sets up 
4 Acts of 1958, c. 364. 
1\ Id., c. 593, adding new §51B to C.L., c. 149. 
6 Acts of 1958, c. 666. 
7 Id., c. 655, amending C.L., c. l51D, inserted by Acts of 1957, c. 778. 
8 See 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §25.3. 
9 This term is defined in Section I of the law as follows: "Trust, all funds derived 
in whole or in part from contributions from employers or employees or both, and 
designed for the purpose of paying or providing for medical or hospital care, pen-
sions, annuities, benefits or retirement or death or unemployment of beneficiaries, 
compensation for injuries or illness, insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or 
life insurance, disability and sickness insurance or accident insurance for the benefit 
of beneficiaries or their dependents." For a description of the new law, see Segal, 
Labor Legislation in 1958 in Massachusetts, 3 Boston B.J. 13 (Jan. 1959). 
10 The lack of appropriations has limited the staff to two employees. 
11 Three cases are pending in the Superior Court involving this regulation and the 
definition of the term "trust" as used in the law. See note 9 supra. 
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the R-I registration form but alternatively permits funds to file a dupli-
cate of the federal D-I form. Another regulation requires amendments 
or modifications of plans to be filed within ninety days of their effective 
date. The fifth regulation defines "employer" and "employees." The 
final regulation temporarily waived until November I, 1959, the $5 
per day penalty for late registration. As yet, no R-2 forms for the 
annual filing have been issued nor has any regulation been promul-
gated permitting duplicate filings of the federal D-2 form. 
§13.17. Labor relations: Model Arbitration Law.1 The new Chap-
ter 150C of the General Laws, based upon the Uniform Arbitration 
Act prepared by the Commissioners on Uniform Laws and endorsed by 
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, is limited to 
labor arbitration.2 It changes the common law3 and makes agree-
ments to arbitrate as well as reinstatement awards enforceable in the 
courts of the Commonwealth. It spells out the respective roles of the 
courts and the arbitrators and, unlike the New York doctrine in Inter-
national Association of Machinists v. Cutter-Hammer, Inc.,4 it places 
the question of "arbitrability" before the arbitrator rather than the 
courts. It provides for judicial review limited to five specific grounds: 
(a) corruption, fraud or undue means; (b) evident partiality or prej-
udicial misconduct; (c) arbitrator exceeds his powers or his award 
requires violation of a law; (d) unfair hearing; (e) no arbitration agree-
ment. The new act, which became effective December 31, 1959, applies 
only to labor agreements written after that date. Although the Lin-
coln Mills case5 may have decreased the importance of a state arbitra-
tion statute, nevertheless the new law of Massachusetts may play an 
important part in the field of labor relations especially with the dele-
gation of the "no man's land" cases to the state courts by the new 
federallaw.6 
§13.18. Three-judge panel in labor disputes. As a result of a 
new law,1 a panel of three Superior Court justices appointed by the 
Chief Justice is required in any action or proceeding involving a labor 
dispute. The bill is a broad one and covers all restraining orders and 
temporary or preliminary injunctions in labor disputes, and even 
covers court actions involving the Massachusetts Labor Relations Com-
mission under Chapter 150A of the General Laws. It can reasonably 
§13.l7. 1 For a detailed report on 1959 labor legislation, see Segal, 1959 Labor 
Legislation in Massachusetts, ~ Boston B.J. 21 (Oct. 1959). 
2 Adopted by Acts of 1959, c. 552. 
3 Sanford v. Boston Edison Co., ~16 Mass. 6~I, 56 N.E.2d 1, 156 A.L.R. 644 (1946); 
Vynior's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 81b, 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (K.B. 1609); see also Magliozzi v. 
Handschumacker Be Co., ~27 Mass. 569, 99 N.E.2d 856 (1951). Even at common law, 
the Court will not upset an award based upon an error of law or of fact. Kesslen 
Brothers, Inc. v. Board of Conciliation, 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 96~, 158 N.E.2d 871. See 
§1~.l2 supra. 
4297 N.Y. 579, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947). 
5 ~5~ U.S. 448, 77 Sup. Ct. 912, I L. Ed. 2d 972 (1957). 
6 For comment on this provision, see §1~.7 supra. 
§1~.l8. 1 Acts of 1959, c. 600. 
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be interpreted to apply to permanent labor lDJunctions. Appeals 
from decisions of the three-judge panel can be taken to a single justice 
of the Supreme Judicial Court.2 The constitutionality of this new 
measure was favorably reported in an advisory opinion to the legis-
lature.a 
§13.19. Employment security. The most important unemploy-
ment compensation bill enacted was a $5 increase in weekly maximum 
benefits to $40 with a revised benefit formula, but with an increase 
in minimum earnings required for eligibility in the base period from 
$500 to $650.1 Dependency benefits were increased by $2 to $6 per 
week per dependent.2 The maximum duration of benefits was in-
creased from 26 to 30 weeks, with an increase in benefits from 34 to 36 
percent of base period earnings.a The solicitation of employers by 
anyone to handle unemployment compensation cases is prohibited.· 
Another measure grants unemployment compensation to persons laid 
off during the negotiations of a collective bargaining contract prior 
to a strike;5 this bill overrules the decision of the Supreme Judicial 
Court in Adomaitis v. Director of the Division of Employment Se-
curity.6 Women who refuse to accept employment between the hours 
of 11 P.M. and 6 A.M. no longer will be denied unemployment compen-
sation benefits.1 Defeated was the labor-sponsored bill to grant un-
employment compensation benefits to strikers after six weeks.8 Also 
defeated were industry's proposals to revise the eligibility requirements 
of the law.1I 
§13.20. Miscellaneous legislation. The state minimum wage law 
was changed so that wage boards can no longer set wage orders below 
$1 per hour, rather than the previous 90 cents, and the minimum for 
gratuity employees was raised 5 cents per hour to 70 cents. Residen-
tial janitors with living quarters were raised $2 per week to a new 
minimum of $30 per week.1 
The use of lie detectors for employees as a condition of employment 
or continued employment was prohibited by Chapter 255 of the Acts 
2 See G.L.. c. 214, §9(6). 
a Opinion of the Justices, 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 775. 158 N.E.2d 354. commented on 
in §13.l5 supra. When the Governor approved the bill. he issued an unusual state-
ment which stated that he had signed "with the understanding that it was intended 
to be applicable only when the question involves a temporary injunction or re-
straining order. The bill as enacted is broadly drawn and is not clear in several 
respects. . .. I believe that this law should be clarified and its application defined 
more precisely." 
§13.l9. 1 Acts of 1959, c. 587. 
2 Id .• c. 589. 
ald., c. 588 . 
• Id .• c. 506. 
5 Id., c. 554. 
6334 Mass. 520. 136 N.E.2d 259 (1956), noted in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.4. 
7 Acts of 1959, c. 533. 
8 House No. 721. 
II Senate Nos. 179, 183. 185. 186. 
§13.20. 1 Acts of 1959, c. 551. 
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of 1959. The Commissioner of Labor and Industries was given power 
to suspend the labor laws for women and minors by Chapter 45 of 
the Acts of 1959. 
A measure was enacted which provided that the excess of any divi-
dends received in a joint contribution insurance policy over the em-
ployer's aggregate expenditures for insurance will be applied by the 
policyholder for the sole benefit of insured employees or members.2 
Sent to studies were such measures as the labor-sponsored proposal 
to grant overtime after 40 hours,S and thirty-one bills dealing with 
Sunday laws and legal holidays.4 
2 Id., c. 552. 
S House No. 1190. 
4 House No. 2811. 
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